Overview of the National-Liberationist People's War in the Philippines

by Jose Maria Sison

Founding Chairperson

Communist Party of the Philippines

THE old merger party of the Communist and Socialist Parties founded the People’s Army against Japan (Hukbalahap) in 1942. This army became the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People’s Liberation Army) in 1948 in order to resist the continued US domination of the Philippines under the US-RP Treaty of General Relations and the Parity Amendment of the Philippine Constitution and the return of the landlords to Central Luzon where the people’s army was based.

The backbone of the HMB was broken in the early 1950s. The semicolonial and semifeudal character of Philippine society seemed to be perpetual and invincible. The exploiting classes of big compradors and landlords blocked every attempt to uphold national sovereignty and carry out genuine and thoroughgoing land reform. In 1957 the reactionary government enacted the Anti-Subversion Law to punish by death officers of the Communist Party or any organization acting as its successor or front.


I. Revival of the National Democratic Revolution

I was among those who revived in the 1960s the mass movements of the workers, peasants and the youth under the leadership of the old merger party of the Socialist and Communist Parties. The ruling system was extremely oppressive and exploitative. We conceived of the national democratic revolution to oppose the system. We were not afraid of the Anti-Subversion Law.

We engaged in mass work to arouse, organize and mobilize the masses. We came under surveillance. We were blacklisted, subjected to propaganda attacks and removed from our jobs. Our mass actions were often disrupted and attacked.

Within the merger party of the Communist and Socialist Parties, the question arose whether to prepare for revolutionary armed struggle or not. The old merger party took the position of carrying out the legal mass movement indefinitely until such time that conditions were supposed to ripen and allow a general uprising.

Young Joma Sison

I was among those who took the position that people’s war must be started on the basis of the already existing mass base in the rural and urban areas. We left the old merger party to re-establish the Communist Party of the Philippines under the theoretical guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism on December 26, 1968. Three months later on March 29, 1969, we founded the New People’s Army to wage people’s war..


II. Fascist Dictatorship of Marcos

In 1969, Marcos spoke of the Philippine society as a social volcano about to explode. In speaking thus, he presented himself as the strong leader to head off the eruption of the volcano. He had plans of using military force to perpetuate himself in power. He expanded the armed forces and was quick to use military force to suppress any manifestation of armed resistance in the countryside. He was responsible for the massacres in Barrios Culatingan, Sta. Lucia and Paraiso.

He launched Oplan Prophylaxis in an attempt to nip in the bud the New People’s Army in 1969. But he failed. The NPA grew from only 65 members with 9 automatic rifles and 26 handguns and single shot rifles to more than 200 automatic rifles from 1969 to early 1970 in Tarlac province. Marcos put together Task Force Lawin, consisting of 5000 troops and policemen, further augmented by so-called barrio self-defense units.

Having anticipated the concentration of enemy forces where we started to build the NPA, we sent expansion cadres to various regions in order to build armed propaganda teams from the mass organizations and deploy them in the villages. When Marcos boasted of having “decimated” the NPA in Central Luzon, the NPA had developed bigger mass bases in Isabela province in another region of the country.

At any rate, Marcos proceeded with his scheme to impose a fascist dictatorship on the people. On August 21, 1971, he suspended the writ of habeas corpus and suppressed all patriotic and progressive legal mass organizations. On September 21, 1972, he declared martial law and concentrated executive, legislative and judicial powers in his hands. In his martial law proclamation he claimed that the NPA had 10,000 rifles. In fact, it had only 300 rifles at the time.

But the 14 years of fascist dictatorship generated conditions favorable to people’s war. The New People’s Army was able to grow to the level of nearly 6000 high powered weapons by the time that Marcos fell in February 1986.


III.Low Intensity Doctrine Under Aquino Regime

Cory Aquino came to power as a consequence of the convergence of contradictory forces against the Marcos fascist regime. The National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) representing the Communist Party of the Philippines, the NPA and other revolutionary forces agreed to hold ceasefire talks with the Aquino regime. A ceasefire agreement was forged on November 25, 1986 to prepare for peace negotiations on substantive issues.


But the peace negotiations came to an end when peasants were massacred while rallying in front of the presidential palace on January 23, 1987. Instead of holding responsible her security guards for the carnage, Aquino blamed the peasants and the entire revolutionary movement and proclaimed the unsheathing of the sword of the state.

With General Fidel Ramos as her defense secretary, she launched a series of national campaign plans Lambat Bitag I, II and III designed to destroy the armed revolutionary movement. The campaign plans were described as the application of the low intensity conflict doctrine. Human rights violations became rampant in both urban and rural areas. Base-denial operations and massacres were often undertaken in the countryside.

For a while, Lambat Bitag appeared to be successful as the armed movement was being weakened by an ultra-Left current which started in the early 1980s and then by a Rightist current which started to pick up strength in 1988. The ultra-Left current damaged the mass base and subsequently the Rightist current called for the liquidation of the Party and the armed revolutionary movement.


IV. Rectification Movement and Peace Negotiations

The ultra-Left current consisted of the premature formation of companies and of unnecessary levels of command and staff which took away Party and NPA personnel from mass work. Due to this erroneous current, the mass base of the revolutionary movement decreased by 15 percent in 1988 and by 60 percent in 1991. This reduced the ability of the NPA to wage tactical offensives although in the main the NPA retained its weapons.

The rectification movement was carried out to criticize and repudiate major errors. It reoriented, reorganized and redeployed the Party and NPA for mass work and for recovering and rebuilding the mass base. It also went against the attempt of the Rightists to liquidate the armed struggle and follow the reformist example of the Soviet leader Gorbachov.

At the same time, the NDFP engaged the Ramos regime in peace negotiations. The Hague Joint Declaration was agreed upon in 1992 to lay the framework for peace negotiations. And several more agreements were forged in order to advance the peace negotiations, which formally opened in 1995.

Some observers think that there was an ebb in the fighting between the NPA and the reactionary forces because of the peace negotiations. But the real cause was the decrease of the mass base and the weakening of the offensive capability of the NPA from 1988 to 1991 and the need for rectification and recovery from 1992 to 1998.


V. Revitalization and Resurgence of People’s War

The rectification movement was successful. The mass base expanded. The NPA could launch tactical offensives in different parts of the Philippines from 1996 onwards. It was able to capture a series of high-ranking military officers, including a general.

The people’s war was revitalized and resurgent in the last two years of the Ramos regime and in the three years of the Estrada regime. Estrada approved the military campaigns of suppression against the NPA and terminated the peace negotiations soon after he signed the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL). Eventually, he became preoccupied with the campaigns against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao.


VI. Oplan Bantay Laya

The Arroyo regime pretended for a while to continue the peace negotiations with the NDFP in 2001. But it decided to launch Oplan Bantay Laya I and II from 2001 to the end of her rule. International human rights organizations and UN human rights agencies called attention to the gross and systematic violation of human rights and made recommendations to the Arroyo regime to improve the human rights situation in the country. The regime turned a deaf ear to all of them.

Since its inception, Oplan Bantay Laya has perpetrated the abduction, torture and extrajudicial killing of more than 1000 social activists, including trade unionists, peasant leaders, human rights advocates, religious and journalists. At the same time, the peasant masses and indigenous peoples in the countryside have been subjected to arbitrary arrests and detention, bombings and forced evictions from their land and homes.

The violent attacks on urban based social activists was calculated to demoralize and weaken the legal mass movement and cut it off from the armed revolutionary movement in the countryside. But the people’s war intensified in response to the escalating campaigns of suppression.



VII. Prospects under the Aquino II Regime

The present Aquino regime follows the US Counterinsurgency Guide and is continuing Oplan Bantay Laya up to January 2011. However, there is already a 5-year military plan intended to defeat and destroy the NPA. By cutting the budgets for education, health and other social services, Aquino has increased the budget for the military and made way for a huge amount of debt service.

He has also increased the budget for an agency that is intended to be the civilian arm for facilitating the forced evacuation of peasants and the indigenous people who are victims of displacements due to militarization and wide-scale land grabbing by mining and logging companies.

There are indications that the Aquino regime is not interested in peace negotiations as a way of addressing the roots of the armed conflict and laying the basis for a just and lasting peace. To date, the Manila government has not reciprocated the NDFP’s demand for the resumption and acceleration of formal peace negotiations and has not responded to the NDFP’s proposal for a Concise Agreement to End Civil War and Achieve Immediate Just Peace. This proposal has been relayed to the GRP since August 27, 2005.

The NDFP is patiently waiting for the Aquino regime to dispatch its emissaries and to form the new negotiating panel of the GRP. ###


(Reprinted with permission from Mr. Joma Sison)


_______


 
Source:

Sison, Jose Maria. People's War. 22 Sept. 2010. http://www.josemariasison.org/?p=5015#more-5015


(Brief Presentation in Expert Workshop on Escalation Processes in Irregular Warfare, Raadszaal,Achter de St Pieter 200, University of Utrecht, 17 September 2010)



Photo credits:

http://www.librarylink.org.ph/revdetails.asp?rev=33

http://joseangelito-angeles.tripod.com/marcos.htm

http://baltimore.indymedia.org/newswire/display/17649




Reposts are licensed to the respective authors. Otherwise, posts by Jesusa Bernardo are licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Philippines.

HACIENDA LUISITA: Land Theft, Massacres, Assassinations, SDO

(Based on excerpts from the article "The Unprincipled Gall of Noynoy Aquino")

Updated November 10, 2011

HACIENDA Luisita well symbolizes the oppression of the Filipino masses both from white-skinned colonizers and local elites. The sprawling Hacienda measures 6, 435 hectares --only 158 hectares short of the combined size of the cities of Manila and Makati. It used to belong to the Spanish firm, Compaña General de Tabacos de Filipinas, or Tabacalera, which acquired it in 1882 from the Spanish colonial crown. While the Philippine Revolution against Spain virtually succeeded, United States imperialist conquest of the islands ensured not only American exploitation of the islands but, as well, that remnants of Spanish colonization remain. Tabacalera’s ownership of Hacienda Luisita was one of those remnants.

In the 1920s, the Spanish company shifted from tobacco to sugar plantation and built a sugar mill as the US sugar quota guaranteed a profitable market. Persisting labor problems and threats from the Hukbalahab rebellion later forced Tabacalera to sell Hacienda Luisita, along with the Central Azucarera de Tarlac sugar mill, in the 1950s. President Ramon Magsaysay is said to have offered the land to Don Jose “Pepe” Cojuangco, Sr., the father of future Philippine President Corazon "Cory" Aquino, in the bid to prevent the then-already very wealthy and powerful Lopezes from acquiring it. The deal was brokered by Don Pepe’s son-in-law, Ninoy Aquino who was then a rising politician.

Stephanie Dychiu of GMA News.TV writes that Don Pepe “received significant preferential treatment and assistance from the government to facilitate his takeover of Hacienda Luisita and Central Azucarera de Tarlac in 1957.” While the Cojuangcos also had their small sugar plantation and had plenty of lands, bank holdings and Philippine pesos, they did not have enough dollars, which was then tightly regulated–to make the purchase. The Central Bank was the first government entity to help Cojuangco. So as to facilitate the foreign exchange flow needed to ensure acquisition of controlling interest in Tabacalera, the CB deposited a portion of the Philippines’ international reserves from a New York bank where Cojuangco took a 10-year loan of $2.1 million. The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) stepped in next, providing a 5.9 million loan to finance the purchase of Hacienda Luisita.

Assistance was extended by the Central Bank with the view that the Cojuangco acquisition would further the government’s land reform program. The 1957 Monetary Board Resolution No. 1240 stipulated that simultaneous with the accommodation for his foreign exchange needs, Cojuangco should purchase Hacienda Luisita but distribute it within ten years “to small farmers in line with the Administration’s social justice program.” That same year, GSIS Resolutions Nos. 1085 & 3202 essentially backed up the Central Bank ruling with different wordings by requiring the subdivision of the hacienda among the tenants who will shoulder the cost at terms and conditions that are reasonable. However, within only a little over two months, Cojuangco had a new GSIS resolution (No. 356) amended to limit it to “….shall be sold at cost to tenants, should there be any.”

 

Theft of Agrarian Land?

Beginning April 1958, Hacienda Luisita and the Tabacalera sugar mill became properties of Jose Cojuangco and his TADECO (Tarlac Development Corporation) company. Instead of Pedro or “Pete” Cojuangco who was Cory’s eldest brother, Ninoy Aquino was chosen as its administrator. Ten years passed but the Cojuangco-Aquino families did not keep their end of the contract. In reply to Land Authority Governor Conrado Estrella’s letter inquiring about the implementation of the loan condition, Cojuangco rather smugly wrote back that “it is doubtful whether the Central Bank had the power to impose that condition which was so alien to its function of stabilizing the country’s monetary system”. Don Pepe died in 1976 without fulfilling his promise to distribute land.

Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino II, TADECO administrator

In 1972 when Martial Law was declared, President Marcos imprisoned his political nemesis and presidential material Ninoy Aquino but did not forcibly compel his family and Cojuangco kin to abide by the land distributorship terms of the 1957-1958 loan and foreign exchange assistance agreements. The TADECO owners did continue to receive written communications seeking to follow up on the 1967 notice(s) but which they always dismissed by claiming that there were no “tenants” and, thus, Hacienda Luisita couldn’t possibly be distributed. Herein, Cory’s family has largely banked their claim to the hacienda on what could be a technicality–the different wordings of the Central Bank and GSIS resolutions–”small farmers” and “tenants,” respectively.

Just before Ninoy and his family were allowed to leave for the United States for medical treatment, the Marcos government pursued the issue in court of the hacienda’s distributorship in court. Civil Case No. 131654 prospered and in December 1985, some two months before the 1986 snap presidential polls contended by the now-widowed Corazon C. Aquino and strongman Marcos, Branch XLIII of the Manila Regional Trial Court handed its decision for TADECO to yield Hacienda Luisita to the Agrarian Reform ministry. In response, the Cojuangco-Aquinos elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.


Post EDSA I future of Hacienda Luisita

Following the ouster of Marcos via the 1986 EDSA “People Power”  and the installation of Cory Cojuangco Aquino as President of the Philippines, the moves of the new government will define the future of Hacienda Luisita tilted in favor of the incumbent's family. The government itself, through Cory's appointive officials, moved to withdraw the case it had already won at the trial court level. Solicitor General Frank Chavez filed a motion dismissing the TADECO case before the Court of Appeals without objection from Agrarian Reform Secretary Philip Juico and GSIS chief Sonny Belmonte--the heads of other government entities with interest in the case. Neither did the Central Bank object to the motion, arguing that the distribution of Hacienda Luisita would already materialize under the new government's agrarian reform program.

Aquino issued Presidential Proclamation No. 131 outlining her agrarian reform program and  Executive Order No. 229, which provided the mechanisms for the implementation of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program or CARP (now the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL). What is notable is that the EO 229 issuance of Cory included the so-called SDO or Stock Distribution Option that is not only unprecedented in previous agrarian reform laws of the land but also regarded as an 'evasive' provision favoring big land owners.

Stock Distribution Option (SDO)

The 1987 Mendiola Massacre involving the death of farmers pressing for genuine agrarian reform seemed to have made Cory speed up the implementation of land reform but not without first inserting SDO into her CARP. The SDO gives farmer tenants shares in a plantation corporation without actually transferring land. Stock Distribution Option had been criticized not only as possibly unconstitutional but more so, as a way for landowners to keep control of the land and farmers–and for the Cojuangco-Aquinos to avoid distributing Hacienda Luisita. As well, the Cory administration had the Court of Appeals dismiss the government case filed against the TADECO owners, who were no less than the President’s own family and kin (she is said to have divested herself of personal shares in the company).

Hacienda Luisita: "development," not land reform?

  When CARP took effect in 1989, the family adopted the SDO option despite many criticisms that the option disadvantaged the farmers. Only less than 5,000 out of the nearly 6,500 hectares of the original Hacienda Luisita land were submitted to the Agrarian Reform department. The exclusion of the combined 386.6 hectares of residential, commercial, road and other land improvement portions of the hacienda markedly lowered the value of land earmarked for land reform to only P40,000 per hectare. The valuation process was also seen as irregular if not appropriate, with the standing crop not only being included but also being categorized as non-land asset. The result is that when the land was incorporated into what is now Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) as spin-off of TADECO, the farmers became nominal shareholders, getting only 33.296% versus the 66.704 percent shares of the Cojuangco-Aquinos.

 

What is more, the SDO scheme was spread over 30 years, which meant that when a worker was fired, quit, or failed to complete require work hours, s/he was no longer eligible to receive the unreleased portion of his or her share, mandays or work hours being the basis of SDO distribution. It also meant that farmers’ entitlements were bound to shrink because new workers could be hired–which is what happened when the original 6,296 farm workers ballooned to almost double by 2005.

In June 2005, Noynoy Aquino’s family eventually distributed all the stock shares to the farmers in one fell swoop and ahead of the controversial 30th year schedule. However, this happened only following the November 16, 2004 Luisita massacre when some seven or so farmers were killed during a protest. The farmers decided to hold a strike amidst fears for their job security and dwindling wages following claims by management that the land was losing money. The Cojuangcos’ long-term land use plan for the HLI–which included NO agricultural area and which already included the controversial Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway or (SCTEx)–had been uncovered.* The farmers realized that the SDO had to go, subsequently petitioning for its revocation in 2003. Their frustration over always being outvoted 4-7 in the HLI board and the mass retrenchment of over 300 farmers in late 2004 also figured in.

Massacre and Assassinations

On November 6, farm workers and Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union workers had launched a prolonged picket of the Gate 1 of the hacienda’s sugar mill. When Arroyo’s government declared an Assumption of Jurisdiction, the Philippine National Police (PNP) forces were called in. Even with the police operation on November 15, they still but failed to disperse the strikers with the usual tear gas, water cannons, and truncheons.

The following day, the union officers were told to proceed to Noynoy’s uncle, Jose “Peping” Cojuangco, Jr. in Makati for negotiations: they did but nothing happened. While the union leaders returned, however, 2 tanks, 17 trucks of soldiers, 700 police, a payloader, 4 water cannon fire trucks, and snipers were already in position. Initially, the dispersal of protesters was attempted with the use of the usual stuff but they fought back by slingshooting with rocks and burying tear gas canisters. When the police and military forces ran out of tear gas and water from the fire trucks, they started firing. Based on the Senate investigation on the incident, no less than 1000 rounds of ammunitions were used to disperse the Hacienda Luisita strikers. Those who were caught were beaten, arrested, and dragged into the military trucks.

Seven people died while 121 were injured, including 32 who sustained gunshot wounds, during what is now commonly referred to as the Hacienda Luisita Massacre. The unfortunate victims who died directly from the protest actions were: Jhayvie Basilio, 20; Juancho Sanchez, 20; Jhune David, 27; Jesus Laza, 34; Jaime Fastidio, 46 Adriano Caballero, 23 Jesse Valdez, 30. Up to the present, no one has been caught or charged for the carnage.

Then Congressman Noynoy Aquino decried the violence but claimed that the police and military merely acted in self-defense. The investigation by doctors led by Dr. Carol Pagaduan-Araullo of the Health Alliance for Democracy would reveal details showing Noynoy was either lying or did not know what he was talking about. Autopsies of the dead and medical examination of the wounded revealed that they were in running, lying, crouching positions when shot. Three bodies supposedly tested positive for gunpowder; however, the doctors, staff, and nurses of the Cojuangco-owned St. Martin de Porres Hospital where the bodies were brought had earlier been told to leave as the military and police took over.

The Hacienda Luisita-related killings did not stop on November 16, 2004, though. Aglipayan priest William Tadena was shot dead while traversing the La Paz, Tarlac provincial highway on the way to say his next mass; Fr. Tadena had mobilized his parishioners in support of the hacienda picket workers. Then there’s sexagenarian peasant leader Ben “Tatang” Conception who was shot dead inside the house of his daughter in Angeles City; he also supported the Luisita strikers.

Perhaps the most obvious kill in terms of association with the fateful picket strike is that of sugar mill union president Ricardo Ramos who was killed by a sniper bullet on the head on October 25, 2005, hours after he distributed what served as wage compensation to the sugar mill workers. He had earlier sought the help of the sheriff to inspect the Cojuangco warehouse when management claimed they had no money to pay wages. When the warehouse was found to be full of sugar, an agreement was made for the sale of the sugar by the Department of Labor and Employment, with the proceeds going to the workers. Management then tried to take charge of the money so they could make payroll deductions for the loans but Ramos refused and demanded the payroll list instead.

It should be noted that Noynoy Aquino did express shock at the murder, saying that Ramos had been always fair to him. The PNP claimed that the communists probably executed the killing because he had been on cooperative terms with management. Given the fact, however, that no police nor military personnel involved in the violent Hacienda Luisita dispersal has ever been charged, the PNP statement does not seem reliable.

There will be more murders of individuals connected with protest actions revolving around Hacienda Luisita. Tirso Cruz, a director of the United Luisita Workers’ Union, was shot dead by motorcycle-riding men on March 18, 2006; Cruz, a member of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, had led actions demanding the withdrawal of the military in ten barangays of the hacienda and protesting against the constructions of the Hacienda Luisita portion of the SCTEx toll way. Another Aglipayan priest connected to the hacienda strikers would bite the dust. Fr. Alberto Ramento, no less than the Supreme Bishop of the church, was stabbed to death on October 3, 2006 while sleeping inside the church rectory: while it appeared to be a robbery, persons close to him strongly suspect his killing was related to the hacienda because he had taken the cause of Fr. Tadena by tending to the farm workers.

Current Status

In what could possibly be a politically motivated but not exactly unfair move, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) placed the Hacienda Luisita under forcible acquisition following its revocation of the SDO on December 23, 2005. The Cojuangco-Aquinos dubbed the development as Arroyo’s vendetta for the Aquino family’s call for her resignation. They appealed and obtained a TRO (temporary restraining order) from the Supreme Court. The case is pending while the TRO has been in effect for over three years now.

Further complicating any future distribution of the hacienda are the loans incurred by the Cojuangco-Aquino family using some portions of the land as mortgage with banks. Noynoy Aquino had changed his statements as to the position of his family with regards Hacienda Luisita and its distribution multiple times over time. In one of them, he defended the SDO option by saying that his family wanted to first make sure that the land that would eventually be distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries are cleared of debt. This one was made quite last February 9, 2010. That same day, he is reported to have stated that he has already talked with his family and relatives from his maternal side to find ways to implement the distribution of land to the approximately 10,000 farmer workers before the expiration of the agrarian reform law ends in 2014.

However, four days earlier while campaigning in Davao City, he is reported to have said that the question of Hacienda Luisita will be a difficult issue to resolve even if he wins as president because it is supposed to be a private corporation. Perhaps, Noynoy’s changing statements are not at all unexpected, given that he is in the midst of his presidential campaign and election periods are always the time for making promises.

2009 Rally during the 5th anniversary of the Hacienda Luisita Massacre

What is troubling is the report of the New York Times that counters Sen. Aquino’s claim that his family has been cooperative with regards the issue of distributing Hacienda Luisita. In its March 16, 2010 issue, the American publication quotes Fernando Cojuangco, the chief operating officer of HLI and the sugar mill as having denied there would be land distribution. Responding to Times reporter Norimitsu Onishi’s query, Noynoy’s cousin reportedly said: “No, we’re not going to. I think it would be irresponsible because I feel that continuing what we have here is the way to go.”



Developments under Aquino III

Indeed, following the controversial ascension of Noynoy Aquino III into the presidency--dubbed by certain sectors as a HOCUS PCOS fraudulent win in the May 10, 2010 automated electoral polls--the Cojuangco family promptly moved towards a direction inimical to the distribution of the sprawling estate. On August 6 this year, Aquino III's family was able to forge another compromise deal

Indeed, following the controversial ascension of Noynoy Aquino III into the presidency--dubbed by certain sectors as a HOCUS PCOS fraudulent win in the May 10, 2010 automated electoral polls--the Cojuangco family promptly moved towards a direction inimical to the distribution of the sprawling estate. In the first week of August, this month, Aquino III's family was able to forge another compromise deal in which farmer beneficiaries were supporsedly given the option to either retain corporate stock shares or receive parcels of land from one-third of the Hacienda Luisita plantation.

However, leaders of the two groups included in the supposed settlement--the United Luisita Workers Union (Ulwu) and the Alliance of Hacienda Luisita Farm Workers (Ambala)--expressed unawareness of the deal when it was first reported in the media. Ambala chairman Felix Nacpil and Ulwu's acting president Lito Bais claim that Noel Mallari and Ildefonso Pingol, who served as "signatories" in behalf of Ambala and Ulwu respectively, have been bought off by HLI management and did not have the authority to represent their union groups. Nacpil pointed out that Mallari was no longer part of Ambala as early as 2003 while Pingol never became chairman of Ulwu and has long been a collaborator with the Cojuangcos.


Militarization

It also appears that militarization figured in the forging of the questionable compromise deal. Bulatlat reports that weeks before the Hacienda Luisita management announced the signing of the August 2010 'compromise agreement'--which would be around the time Congress had already declared Aquino III "President-elect"--the sugar plantation workers "were subjected to militarization, the kind that sowed fear among the residents, particularly those opposed to the stock distribution option."

Hacienda Luisita residents and plantation workers talk of how military harassment often targeted officials of the two groups whose 'impostor' union representatives were signatories to the recent compromise deal--the Alliance of Hacienda Luisita Farm Workers (Ambala) and United Luisita Workers’ Union (Ulwu). In one case, a resident talked of how the eldest daughter of a former Ambala officer was forced to resign from her new job at a mall because soldiers had been trailing her and threatening to abduct her unless her father's head is served "on a platter."

Farm workers of the controversial estate regard the the supposed deal as a sham and suspect that it is meant to influence the decision of the High Court, which began hearing oral arguments on the Hacienda Luisita dispute on August 18, 2010. Among the issues the Supreme Court will tackle are whether or not:

• the SDO conforms to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, Section 31;
• PARC has the jurisdiction, authority or power in its 2005 revocation of the SDO, and if so, whether there is legal basis for revoking the SDO agreement;
• the petitioners before the DAR-PARC are genuine parties-in-interest; and
• the SDO revocation and resulting agricultural land distribution will cause the dissolution of HLI.

August 18, 2010 National Day of Outrage March Rally to the Supreme Court

The recent compromise deal has been criticized for its insidious provision allocating only a mere 30 percent of land--equivalent to 33 percent of stock shares--because the rest of the land is supposedly not 'devoted to agriculture.' Thus, aside from the fact that the very SDO option is a breach of the spirit of land reform under which the Hacienda Luisita should be subjected to under the 1957 agreement, the settlement immediately deprives the farmers of 70 percent of the hacienda land.


_________


Based on:

Bernardo, Jesusa. The Unprincipled Gall of Noynoy Aquino. Newsvine. 26 March 2010. http://jesusabernardo.newsvine.com/_news/2010/03/26/4074909-the-unprincipled-gall-of-noynoy-aquino


References:

 Arkibong Bayan archived webpages: The Hacienda Luisita Massacre. 10 November 2009. http://arkibongbayan.org/2009/2009-11Nov10-Hacienda%20Luisita%20Massacre%20Archives/Hacienda%20Luisita%20Massacre%20archives.htm

"DAR confirms Hacienda's RoW overprice." Charlie V. Manalo. The Daily Tribune. http://www.tribune.net.ph/20091119/headlines/20091119hed1.html

Dychiu, Stephanie. After Luisita massacre, more killings linked to protest. GMANews.TV.
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/183662/after-luisita-massacre-more-killings-linked-to-protest

Dychiu, Stephanie. "Cory's land reform legacy to test Noynoy's political will." GMANews.TV. 01/22/2010 . http://www.gmanews.tv/story/182195/corys-land-reform-legacy-to-test-noynoys-political-will

Dychiu, Stephanie. "Hacienda Luisita's past haunts Noynoy's future." GMANews.TV. http://www.gmanews.tv/story/181877/hacienda-luisitas-past-haunts-noynoys-future

Dychiu, Stephanie. "How a workers' strike became the Luisita Massacre." GMANews.TV. 01/26/2010. http://www.gmanews.tv/story/182515/how-a-workers-strike-became-the-luisita-massacre

FACTS ABOUT HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED and the STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION. 13 November 2009. http://www.kilusangmagbubukid.org/resource/facts-about-hacienda-luisita-incorporated-and-stock-distribution-option

"How Hacienda Luisita Stock Scheme Led to Farmers' Misery." Bulatlat.com. November 16, 2009. http://www.bulatlat.com/main/2009/11/16/how-hacienda-luisita-stock-scheme-led-to-farmers'-misery/

Manalo, Charlie. "Reopen SDO scheme probe, Luisita farmers dare Senate." The Daily Tribune. 31 January 2010. http://www.classicposters.com/headlines/20100131hed1.html 

"Noynoy cries unfair, but NY Times stands by Luisita story." GMANews.TV. 03/17/2010. http://www.gmanews.tv/story/186365/noynoy-cries-unfair-but-ny-times-stands-by-luisita-story

Noynoy: Hacienda Luisita distributed to farmers by 2014. 9 February 2010. http://www.noynoy.ph/blog/2010/02/09/noynoy-hacienda-luisita-distributed-to-farmers-by-2014/

Olea, Ronalyn. ‘Breakthrough Deal’ Is a Lie Meant to Sway Supreme Court Decision on Hacienda Luisita, Say Farmers. Bulatlat.com. 5 August 2010. http://www.bulatlat.com/main/2010/08/05/farmers-say-hacienda-luisita-%E2%80%98breakthrough-deal%E2%80%99-is-a-lie-meant-to-sway-decision-of-supreme-court/

Olea, Ronalyn. In Crafting ‘Sham’ Deal, Cojuangco-Aquinos Turned to Leaders Who Had Earlier Betrayed Farm Workers. Bulatlat.com. 13 August 2010. http://www.bulatlat.com/main/2010/08/13/in-crafting-%E2%80%98sham%E2%80%99-deal-cojuangco-aquinos-turned-to-leaders-who-had-earlier-betrayed-farm-workers/

Oliveros, Benjie. With the ‘Compromise Agreement’, Hacienda Luisita Farmers Are Back to Where They Started. Bulatlat.com. http://www.bulatlat.com/main/2010/08/13/benjie-oliveros-with-the-%E2%80%98compromise-agreement%E2%80%99-hacienda-luisita-farmers-are-back-to-where-they-started/


Pulta, Benjamin. SC to hear oral arguments on HLI conflict. The Daily Tribune. 18 August 2010. http://www.tribuneonline.org/headlines/20100818hed4.html 

Salamat, Marya. Militarization, Harassment Intensified in Luisita in Run-Up to Signing of 'Sham Deal.' Bulatlat.com. 10 August 2010. http://www.bulatlat.com/main/2010/08/10/militarization-harassment-intensified-in-hacienda-luisita-in-run-up-to-signing-of-sham-agreement/

Ramirez, Mon. The Math of the Hacienda Luisita Issue. http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=429260398465&id=1042770868&ref=mf

Republic of the Philippines. Executive Order No. 229, July 22, 1987:  PROVIDING THE MECHANISMS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM.  http://www.lawphil.net/executive/execord/eo1987/eo_229_1987.html

Republic of the Philippines. PROCLAMATION NO. 131. http://www.dar7.net.ph/Laws/aj_laws_pp131.htm



Photo credits:

arkibongbayan.org/abs-cbn.com

bahay-bahayan.com

bulatlat.com

Caravan to Luisita album. Kilusang Mayo Uno account. http://www.facebook.com/album.php?aid=41864&id=1054826624

Noynoy Hacienda Luisita- The Real Story-Part 1. Youtube. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8D9v0-5EWaU&feature=player_embedded

Sarah Raymundo album. http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?pid=1497075&id=1022200286&ref=fbx_album

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Joma on the US-Aquino Regime, Peace & Revolution

(Interview by Roselle Valerio of Prof. JOSE MARIA SISON, Chief Political Consultant, NDFP Negotiating Panel)


1. On the basis of Aquino's policy pronouncements, appointments and other actions since his oath-taking as president, how do you characterize his regime and how do you compare it with the Arroyo regime?

JMS: The Aquino regime is the latest of regimes servile to US imperialism and representative chiefly of the local exploiting classes of big compradors and landlords. It follows such US-directed policies as neoliberal globalization and the so-called global war on terror which is used to justify state terrorism and US military intervention in the Philippines. 
 
The Aquino regime is fundamentally a continuation of the Arroyo regime. It is another running dog of US imperialism with a different collar. It tries to make itself look different from the Arroyo regime through sheer propaganda. From day to day, it does some publicity stunts and gimmicks to deflect attention from the big basic problems of the people, which are the main causes of poverty and corruption.

Benigno Simeon"Noynoy" Cojuango Aquino III

2. Would Aquino be able to fulfill his promise of sending Gloria M. Arroyo to prison for human rights violations and for plunder? Will it eliminate corruption and thus eliminate poverty. His main slogan has been: kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap (if no corrupt, no poor). What will happen if he does not fulfill his promises?

JMS: Aquino is already making it evident that he has no intention of sending Arroyo to prison for human rights violations and for plunder. The Truth Commission is a device for getting Gloria M. Arroyo and her cohorts off the hook. The executive order creating the commission protects Arroyo from being held liable for plunder and human rights violations. The commission is also impotent and redundant even when it comes to the investigation ofgraft and corruption cases. The commission head Hilario Davide is a shared valet of the Aquino and Arroyo families.

One who promises to eliminate poverty solely by eliminating corruption is obviously a big liar from the very outset. The Aquino regime cannot eliminate poverty and corruption without confronting foreign and feudal exploitation and carrying out national industrialization and land reform. Poverty and corruption will persist so long as the evils of foreign monopoly capitalism, domestic feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism afflict the country. In the backroom of the Aquino regime, the big comprador-landlord Cojuangco-Aquino family is plotting to keep Hacienda Luisita and amass wealth in other corrupt ways like privatizing Pagcor.

Going by the example of Arroyo sending Estrada to prison in three months' time in 2001, the people expect Aquino to send her to prison before the end of September. If he fails, the people will take him to task for making false promises and lying. He will be hounded, discredited and isolated by the nonfulfillment of these promises that he has made and of course by the new wave of corruption that is sure to arise from the new set of thieving bureaucats handpicked by the big foreign and local businessmen, the Kamag-anak, Inc . and the Classmates, Inc.

Joma with Pen. On left side: Clenched fist with hammer sculpted by Rey Paz Contreras,
gift of Kilusang Mayo Uno to Prof. Sison for 50 years of service to the Filipino people.

3. Has Aquino taken any decisive steps to stop human rights violations and improve the human rights situation in the Philippines? Is he heeding the Alston report and recommendations? Do you expect him to do so sometime later?

JMS: Aquino has not taken any decisive steps to stop human rights violations. He has never spoken strongly and definitively against the gross and systematic violations of human rights committed by the previous regime. He has ignored the Alston report and recommendations. So far Aquino has not released the Morong 43 and other political prisoners. He condones the continuing use of false charges of common crimes against the panelists, consultants and staffers of the NDFP negotiating panel.

Despite the severe economic crisis and the bankruptcy of the reactionary government, Aquino has boasted that he would give everything that the military forces demand. He has openly insinuated that he wishes to double the strength of the military because the population has doubled since the time of Marcos. He has openly urged the military to give priority to counterinsurgency and escalate military campaigns.

The military forces of the reactionary government continue to commit human rights violations and carry out Oplan Bantay Laya. Aquino and his defense secretary Gazmin have demanded ceasefire, surrender and disarming of the New People's Army (NPA) as precondition to peace negotiations. The AFP chief of staff has boasted that the military would decimate the New People's Army in the next three years.

4. What is the purpose of Aquino and the military officials in preconditioning the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations with a general ceasefire? Is it to prevent peace negotiations or pressure the NDFP towards capitulation and the laying aside of the people's demands for reforms? Is Aquino really interested in peace negotiations as a way of addressing the roots of the armed conflict and agreeing on reforms as the basis for a just and lasting peace?

JMS: Aquino and the military officials appear to be grossly ignorant or deliberately contemptuous of The Hague Joint Declaration which prohibits any side of the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations from preconditioning the formal talks with ceasefire, surrender or anything else that negates the character and purpose of peace negotiations. In fact, Aquino seeks to violate The Hague Joint Declaration by making a demand for a general ceasefire as precondition.

He is expressing the old reactionary position of treating the peace negotiations as a mere tool of deception in the so-called counterinsurgency. Obviously, he regards the peace negotiations as a way of immediately pacifying the revolutionary forces and laying aside the need for negotiating and forging agreements as the basis for a just and lasting peace. He follows the US Counterinsurgency Guide which considers peace negotiations as dispensable f in defeating the armed revolutionary movement.

Aquino and the presidential adviser Teresita Deles follow the US line that peace negotiations are a disposable embellishment on the use of all-out military force to dismantle and disarm the revolutionary forces. The so-called military solution is combined with pretenses at good governance, delivery of services, economic rehabilitation and development and security reforms. The Aquino regime is banking so much on US military and financial assistance. It is salivating for the grant of USD 434 M from the Millennium Challenge Corp. in exchange for further US military intervention and super-exploitation by US corporations and banks.

Now, the regime appears to find no urgent necessity to engage the NDFP in peace negotiations. But we should not be surprised if it is willing to resume formal talks for one reason or another. It does not give up the use of the peace negotiations in trying to deceive the people or to trick the revolutionary forces. At the same, the current worsening economic crisis, the widespread social discontent, mass protests and the intensifying revolutionary armed struggle are stimuli for Aquino to approach the negotiating table.

5. Under the rotten ruling system of big compradors and landlords and the ever worsening crisis, how far can the Aquino regime make pretenses at good governance, delivery of social services, economic rehabilitation and development and security reforms? Does the regime have enough resources to satisfy the economic and social demands of the people and at the same time to increase the personnel and equipment of the military, police and paramilitary forces?

JMS: The Aquino regime cannot go very far in its pretenses at good governance. Aquino himself has become the most corrupt official by virtue of his accepting campaign funds from the imperialists and from his fellow big comprador-landlords and thus being bound to serve their interests. He has appointed to lucrative positions certain officials close to big business and notorious for being corrupt in previous regimes. The Cojuangco-Aquino family is now using the power and influence of the president for the corrupt purpose of preventing land reform and clawing on to Hacienda Luisita.

The persistence of the ruling systemand its worsening crisis render impossible any adequate delivery of social services to the people and any economic rehabilitation and development for the country. The budgetary and trade deficits will grow. Local and foreign borrowing will become ever more burdensome. Collecting additional taxes will become ever more difficult in a depressed economy. How can Aquino impress anyone about tax collection when he is silent about the unpaid tax obligations and ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, Eduardo Cojuangco, Lucio Tan and other big shots.

The Aquino regime can only fan the flames of the armed revolution by using public funds and foreign grants to enlarge its military forces in terms of personnel and equipment and escalate campaigns of military suppression. Within the span of the next three years, Aquino wishes to destroy or debilitate the revolutionary forces through propaganda stunts and brute military force. He can only fan the flames of people's war by exacerbating the socio-economic crisis with rising military expenditures.

6. How can the revolutionary forces and the people overcome the plan of the Aquino regime to destroy or debilitate them? Are they ready to fight tit for tat, deliver their own blows on the regime and the entire ruling system and advance to a new and higher stage of the people's war?

JMS: I shall answer your question as a political scientist. The revolutionary forces draw the participation and support of the broad masses of the people, especially the workers, peasants and lower middle class, because the semicolonial and semifeudal ruling system is rotten, increasingly exploitative and oppressive and ceaselessly afflicted with socio-economic and political crisis. As the crisis of the ruling system and the world capitalist system worsens, the reactionary classes will have more difficulties because of increasingly violent factional contradictions and because of the further rise of the revolutionary movement.

The revolutionary forces have adopted the general line of people's democratic revolution through protracted people's war. This line has served the revolutionary forces and the people very well since the re-establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1968. They grew from small to big and from weak to strong. They were able to overcome the 14-year long Marcos fascist dictatorship and build the New People's Army nationwide. Since the fall of Marcos, they have been able to overcome all kinds of violence and deception under such operational plans as Lambat Bitag I, II and III and Bantay Laya I and II, conducted by the post-Marcos regimes. They have a wealth of experience and the will to win.

According to the publications of the CPP Central Committee, the armed revolutionary movement has a plan of advancing the people's war from the strategic defensive to the strategic stalemate in the next five years. The CPP has laid out the political requirements for such an advance. These involve the further strengthening of the CPP, NPA, the NDFP, the mass organizations and the organs of political power. The Party has also made clear the strategy and tactics tto wage intensive and extensive guerrilla warfare on the basis of an ever widening and deepening mass base, develop on favorable terrain highly mobile strike forces that can operate on inter-front, inter-provincial and regional scales and aim to build some 179 guerrilla fronts within the next five years.

7. Among the political requirements for advancing the people's war, what do you think is the most important one? Please answer according to your rich stock of knowledge and revolutionary experience since the 1960s.

JMS: In my opinion, the most important political requirement is the development of the mass movement by arousing, organizing and mobilizing the masses of workers, peasants and urban petty bourgeois who comprise the basic forces of the people's democratic revolution. After all, the revolution is a mass undertaking, from the process of overthrowing the rotten system to that of building a new Philippines that is truly independent and democratic, socially just, progressive and peaceful.

Success in the mass movement is best measured by solid mass organizing, concretely by a count of how many people become members of the various mass organizations, as a result of conscious and militant leadership, mass agitation and propaganda, members recruiting others and mass campaigns. The simplest and most effective method of expanding the mass organizations is to encourage all members to perform their basic duty of recruiting new members from among their friends, colleagues and relatives who are willing to accept the organization's constitution and program.

The mass organizations are based in the urban areas as well as in the rural areas, inside and outside of the guerrilla fronts. They can grow by relying on and trusting the masses. The imposition of unreasonable standards and sectarian biases and then the failure to further develop the limited number of members are factors that stunt the growth of mass organizations. The large numbers of members in the basic mass organizations serve as the main source of candidate members for the CPP and as its main basis for expansion. 

8. Can you say more about building the CPP? What are the requirements involved? What factors cause the expansion or contraction of the Party organization?

JMS: I can talk in general terms. The ever worsening crisis of the ruling system generates the conditions favorable to the building of patriotic and progressive mass organizations as well as to the building of the Party. The building of the Party entails ideological, political and organizational building. Ideological building involves education in applying Marxism-Leninism-Maoism on the history and current circumstances of the Philippines. Political building involves developing the mass movement along the line of people's democratic revolution. Organizational building involves upholding the principle of democratic centralism.

May I focus on the question of expansion or contraction of the Party organization. Let me start by saying that it is the basic duty of all Party members to recruit as candidate-members those who accept the Constitution and Program of the Party. Within the period of candidature of six months for workers and peasants; and one year for the urban petty bourgeois, the Party unit concerned has the duty to see to it that the candidate-member is raised to being a full member by taking the basic level of Party education and carrying out the assigned tasks.

The Party organization expands quite rapidly if this standard is followed. If not, the growth of the Party organization is stunted. Among the causes of the contraction of the Party organization are the failure to constantly urge Party members to carry out their basic duty of recruiting candidate-members in accordance with the Party Constitution, conceit manifested by applying unreasonable standards that deviate from the constitution, over-suspiciousness and inability to recognize the honesty of prospective and current candidate-members and sheer negligence of the duty to recruit candidate-members or to help them become full members.

9. From your study of its published documents, can you explain how feasible it is for the CPP to establish 179 guerrilla fronts, develop relatively stable areas and reach the stage of strategic stalemate? Can you explain the strategy and tactics being pursued by the CPP?

JMS: Indeed, I have studied the CPP documents. The CPP has set itself five years to carry out its plan to establish 179 guerrilla fronts, develop relatively stable base areas and reach the stage of strategic stalemate. At present, such revolutionary forces as the Party, the people's army, the mass organizations and organs of political power are well-based among the toiling masses and are spread out nationwide. According to the CPP, these forces will expand and consolidate themselves from year to year.

The NPA is the main revolutionary force for advancing the people's war. It pursues the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside in order to accumulate armed strength. It chooses the best possible physical and social terrain for basing itself and from there advance wave upon wave. It aims to raise its strength and offensive capabilities and to improve coordination among its units on the scale of several guerrilla fronts, provinces and regions.

It launches only those tactical offensives it can win and avoids battles that it is not sure of winning. Its main purpose is to wipe out enemy units, accumulate weapons and form more combat units. It seeks to punish the human rights violators, the plunderers and the worst anti-social elements. It is determined to dismantle anti-people, anti-national and antidemocratic enterprises (especially those engaged in landgrabbing, mining, logging for export and the like) in order to combat the worst forms of exploitation, make more land available for free distribution to the landless tillers and protect and conserve natural resources for national industrialization.

10. What is the relationship of the NPA to the mass movement in the guerrilla fronts, the organs of political power, the people's militia and self-defense units? How is this relationship affected by the drive to reach the strategic stalemate?

JMS: Let me continue restating what I read from CPP publications. Under the leadership of the CPP, the NPA does mass work in the guerrilla fronts. It does propaganda work to arouse the masses. It guides and encourages the masses to organize themselves in various forms of voluntary association. It urges them to undertake mass campaigns for the benefit of the people, such as those related to public education, land reform and production, health, defense, cultural affairs, settlement of disputes and so on.

The NPA guarantees the development of the barrio organizing committees into barrio revolutionary committees as local organs of democratic power. It gives basic training to the people's militia as the police force and the self-defense units of the various mass organizations. It is of key importance to develop Party members from the ranks of advanced mass activists and form the Party branch as the leading force of the local mass organizations, the organs of democratic power, the militia and the self-defense units.

When the local revolutionary forces led by the Party branch exist, the NPA units can be confident of having a guerrilla base for opening new areas as well as for launching tactical offensives. In the drive to reach the strategic stalemate, the direct mass base for people's war needs to expand and consolidate, become relatively stable and support the mobile strike forces of the NPA in undertaking tactical offensives for definite periods of time. The NPA can concentrate on tactical offensives because the local revolutionary forces can take charge of their own affairs in the localities.

11. How would you compare the longevity of the Aquino regime and that of the armed revolutionary movement?

JMS: The Aquino regime is just a passing pro-imperialist big comprador-landlord regime. It has made too many promises that are false and cannot be fulfilled. It is running against itself. It will soon be utterly discredited and isolated. Aquino has cashed in on the mystique of his parents. He is wantonly spending it. The revolutionary mass movement of the people will become stronger by fighting the regime and will outlast it. It will continue to exist and grow for as long as there is a need to fight for national and social liberation and to build a people's democratic system. ###

(Reprinted with permission from Mr. Joma Sison)

__________

Source: 

Valerio, Roselle. Interview with Prof. Jose Maria Sison, Chief Political Consultant, NDFP Negotiating Panel. Liberace International. 11 August 2010. 

Photo Credits:

http://www.journal.com.ph/index.php/component/content/article/43-headlines/8359-noynoy-treated-in-us.html

http://www.facebook.com/notes/joma-sison/on-the-us-aquino-regime-peace-and-revolution/476753743065